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By Fabius Maximus
May 7, 2007
Summary
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Al Qaeda has not yet defeated us, to some extent
because they are dumb as rocks.
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That is good, because so are we.
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Unfortunately, #1 could change at any time.
Background Information
For those of you who are not James Bond fans, Dr.
No and Ernest Blofeld are evil master-minds. Dr. No operated a secret
base under an island in the Caribbean. Ernst Stavro Blofeld was the
founder and chief executive of SPECTRE, the Special Executive for Counter-intelligence,
Terrorism, Revenge and Extortion – a secret global evil conspiracy.
What should be one of our greatest fears
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What if bin Laden and the insurgent leaders in Iraq
were as smart as these classic villains? What would they do next? They
would consult the literature about modern warfare, the works of Martin
van Creveld and others. Perhaps from these they could learn how to defeat
America.
They would seek a Grand Strategy, what the late
American strategist Col. John Boyd (USAF) said should focus one’s actions
– political, economic, and military – so
as to:
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Increase our solidarity, our internal
cohesion.
Weaken your opponents’ resolve and
internal cohesion.
Strengthen your allies' relationships
to us.
Attract the uncommitted to your cause.
End conflicts on favorable terms,
without sowing the seeds for future conflicts.
Patterns of Conflict,
Chart 139
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Then they would distil this into a handbook, perhaps
with 28 steps or articles. It might look something like this…
Article #1: know your enemy.
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Know the people, the topography,
economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village,
road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient
grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your
district.
“Twenty-Eight
Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency”,
David Kilcullen, Military Review, May – June 2006.
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This sets a high standard for “them” to be the world
expert about us.” In WWII the leaders of neither the Japanese Empire
nor the Third Reich came close to this mark, and so suffered catastrophic
defeat. Al Qaeda has an advantage both of them lacked: thousands of
people from the Middle East have studied and worked in America during
the past fifty years. The combination of deep familiarity plus some
cognitive and emotional distance might give them perspectives on America
that Americans’ lack.
Fortunately al Qaeda has proven unable to conduct
effected Information Operations and Public Diplomacy (IO and PD in the
jargon of the counterinsurgency consiglieri). Perhaps even less effectively
than our efforts in Iraq.
If al Qaeda can tap this knowledge, how might
they apply it? Bin Laden might start with Boyd's second point: Weaken “our” opponents’ resolve and internal cohesion.
He might easily wage info-warfare against us, seeking
to fracture us, weaken our will to fight, and destroy our reputation
in the eyes of our allies. It’s a small world today, tightly linked
by the many news media. For example, al Qaeda could publicize and even
exaggerate the damage done to Iraq’s infrastructure, the resulting suffering
of its people, and – most of all – the direct and indirect deaths
of Iraq’s people since the invasion. As Juan Cole reports on his blog
Informed Comment,
the Middle Eastern media are filled with such stories – but al Qaeda
has not attempted to convey these stories to receptive elements of American
society.
Bin Laden might strike at the confidence of the
American people in its military institutions and at the cohesion of
our Armed Forces. Could he have written anything more damaging than
these articles?
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Many female soldiers say they
are sexually assaulted by their male comrades and can't
trust the military to protect them. ”The knife wasn't for
the Iraqis," says one woman. "It was for the guys on my
own side."
The private war of women soldiers”, by Helen Benedict,
Salon (March 7, 2007)
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Or this…
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I went to see Swift last July as
I was immersed in a series of interviews with women who'd
gone to Iraq and come home with PTSD. I was trying to understand
how being a woman fit into both the war and the psychological
consequences of war. The story I heard over and over, the
dominant narrative really, followed similar lines to Swift's:
allegations of sexual trauma, often denied or dismissed
by superiors; ensuing demotions or court-martials; and lingering
questions about what actually occurred.
“The
Women's War”, New York Times Magazine (March 18,
2007)
It's been three decades since women
were admitted to West Point with a promise of equality for
the sexes. But the nation's oldest service academy is marching
into history as a misogynistic boy's club where sexual impropriety
is endemic, some victims and advocates say. One West Point
official who has worked with sexual assault victims for
more than a decade said the climate is so hostile that,
on average, 10 female cadets leave or are forced out of
West Point every year after being raped, assaulted or abused.
“West Point's sexual dysfunction”, Times Herald-Record
(April 29, 2007)
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Consider the publication of these articles – and
the ones to follow – as a tactical
strike at the cohesion of our forces (alienating a key component group),
at their reputation in the eyes of America’s citizens. In this sense
their truth or falsity is irrelevant. All that matters are the consequences.
This could open another front in the war – or perhaps more accurately
– another domestic front in the war.
If bin Laden had unleashed these articles, he would
be a happy man today. If bin Laden was smart enough to exploit the internal
divisions in our society, America would be in serious trouble. Fortunately
for us, he is not that smart. Unfortunately, we are dumb enough so that
he need not be so smart.
Our own worst enemy
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The sharpest sword will rust when
plunged into salt water.
Attributed to Lao Tse
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There are a thousand ways bin Laden could attack
our ability to wage war in Iraq. The Vietnam War was lost at home as
well as on the battlefield, as our enemies attacked our heart as well
as our fists. Inflicting such damage appears to be beyond al Qaeda’s
capabilities, but our civilian and military leaders have proved able
to do so without their help.
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If you haven't heard the news, I'm
afraid your Army is broken, a victim of too many missions
for too few soldiers for too long.
“Is
the Army headed for collapse?”, by Major General Robert
H. Scales (ret.), Washington Times (March 30, 2007).
The author is a former commander of the Army War College.
The U.S. Army broke in the 1970s
in the wake of the Vietnam War and the end of the draft.
… the crumbling occurred over time, becoming apparent only
decades later. Today's Army is stretched past its breaking
point by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sounds of
its collapse may be faint enough for policymakers in Washington
to ignore, but they are there.
“Broken
Arrow: How the U.S. Army broke in Iraq”, by Phillip
Carter, Slate (March 30, 2007). Carter was a Captain
in the US Army, with nine years of active and reserve service
– including 2005-06 with the 101st Airborne in Iraq.
Recent graduates of the US Military
Academy at West Point are choosing to leave active duty
at the highest rate in more than three decades, a sign to
many military specialists that repeated tours in Iraq are
prematurely driving out some of the Army's top young officers.
"West
Point grads exit service at high rate”, Boston Globe
(April 11, 2007)
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The above examples illustrate simple ways that al
Qaeda could attack us. The next article describes even more effective
and insidious techniques.
Article 2: Diagnose the problem
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Analysis of the remaining 27 articles have been
deleted by the Editors of DNI, as these insights could prove dangerous
to America’s security if exploited by our enemies.
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Afterward
Are the things reported here good or bad? Please consult a priest or
philosopher for answers to such questions. This author only
discusses what was, what is, and what might be.
Please send your comments and corrections on this article to
fabmaximus@hotmail.com
Appendices
Who was Fabius Maximus?
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Fabius Maximus was the Roman leader
who saved Rome from Hannibal by recognizing its weakness
and therefore its the need to conserve and regenerate. He turned from the
easy path of macho “boldness” to the long and difficult
task of rebuilding Rome’s strength and greatness. His life
holds profound lessons for 21st Century America.
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Qualifications of the Author?
Read the past articles by Fabius Maximus. A work
of intellectual analysis stands on its own logic, supported by the author’s
track record.
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Iraq Series - 2006-2007
Part V
– The Iraq insurgency has ended, which opens a
path to peace, March 13, 2007
Part IV
– Why We Lose, January 4, 2007
Part
III – More Paths to Failure in Iraq, December 19,
2006
Part II
– What Should We Do in Iraq? December 9, 2006
Part I
– Situation Report on the Expedition to Iraq, November
12, 2006
Grand Strategy
Part IV
–
How America Can Survive
and Even Prosper in the 21st Century, April 30, 2007
Part
III
– America's Most Dangerous Enemy
Interlude
–
Top Secret US Government Documents About
Iraq
Part II
– The Fate
of Israel
Part I
– The Myth of Grand Strategy
Forecasts
Forecast: the
Death of the American Constitution, February 22,
2007
More Forecasts
– Part Two
More Forecasts
– Part
One
Forecasts for the
American Expedition to Iraq – the Sequel
Forecasts for
the American Expedition to Iraq
Lessons Learned
from the American Expedition to Iraq
Women
Warriors
The Rioting in France
and the Decline of the State
The
Plame Affair and the Decline of The State
Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?
Thoughts
on William Lind’s Fourth Generation War field manual (FMFM
1-A)
Iraq Series - 2003
Scorecard
#4: War in Iraq: New developments & Implications, November
22
Scorecard
#3: A look at the Coalition’s Progress in Iraq, November
9
Scorecard
#2: an Iraq Update, October 31
Scorecard
#1: How well are we doing in Iraq? September 22
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